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INTRODUCTION 
 
“As the circle of science grows larger, it touches paradox in more places.”1  
Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
In The Many Faces of Realism, Hilary Putnam suggests that although the phenomenon of 
conceptual relativity has become pervasive in contemporary scientific practice, 
“contemporary logicians and meaning theorists generally philosophize as if it did not exist.”2 
Putnam suggests that since the end of the nineteenth century, modern scientists have begun to 
take note of a variety of ‘non-classical’ phenomena, in particular the idea that “there are ways 
of describing what are (in some way) the ‘same facts’ which are (in some way) ‘equivalent’ 
but also (in some way) ‘incompatible’.”3 Rather than concluding that we are presented in 
such situations with a factual contradiction between two competing descriptions that must be 
decided one way or the other, Putnam urges us instead to recognise the way in which the 
employment of different concepts at a fundamental level can generate incompatible 
descriptions of the same phenomena that are, in some sense, equivalent.  
In addition to scientific examples, Putnam describes a variety of situations in mathematics 
and logic which he claims exhibit the same kind of conceptual relativity. To describe these 
kinds of situations as characterised by a disagreement in fact, Putnam suggests, is to ignore 
the way in which many of the fundamental concepts that we use to describe the world do not 
possess a unique, correct interpretation. In other words, Putnam argues that “there is nothing 
that dictates a sublime ‘right sense’ upon words like ‘individual,’ ‘object,’ ‘exist’ in that 
way.”4 Putnam’s suggestion, therefore, is that some disagreements only appear substantial 
because we assume (incorrectly, according to Putnam) that we operate with common and 
fixed interpretations of fundamental notions such as existence, object or individual. 
The phenomenon of conceptual relativity plays a central role in Putnam’s rejection of a 
cluster of positions he unites under the banner of Metaphysical Realism.
5
 For Putnam, 
metaphysical realism boils down to the idea that the facts of the world (or the truth of 
propositions) are fixed by something mind-independent and language-independent. As a 
consequence of this idea, Putnam suggests that the Metaphysical Realist is committed to the 
existence of a unique correspondence between statements in a language or theory and a 
determinate collection of mind and language-independent objects in the world. Such talk of 
correspondence between facts and objects, Putnam argues, presupposes that we find 
                                                 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, ed. Michael Tanner, trans. Shaun Whiteside (London: Penguin 
Classics, 2003), §15. 
2 Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism (La Salle: Open Court, 1987), pp. 29-30. 
3 Ibid., p. 29. 
4 Hilary Putnam, Ethics without Ontology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 47. 
5 Putnam makes use of capital letters here to distinguish these views from the one he later adopted and called 
‘metaphysical realism’ in the lower case. Following his usage, we will use the capitalised notation from here on 
in. 
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ourselves in possession of a fixed metaphysically-privileged notion of ‘object’. Since it is 
precisely this possibility of dictating a right notion of concepts such as ‘individual’ and 
‘object’ that Putnam takes the phenomenon of conceptual relativity to undermine, he 
naturally concludes that conceptual relativity presents a deep and insurmountable challenge 
to Metaphysical Realism. 
There are, however, some aspects of Putnam’s notion of conceptual relativity that are not 
particularly clear. First, Putnam describes conceptual relativity as a unified and rather 
specific phenomenon, yet the examples that Putnam employs in his presentation of 
conceptual relativity range broadly from situations in empirical science to abstract 
descriptions of logic and mathematics. If situations of conceptual relativity revolve around 
ways of describing the ‘same facts’ in ‘equivalent’ but ‘incompatible’ ways, then what are we 
to make of the idea that what notions of fact, equivalence and incompatibility amount to in 
logic might differ from what the same notions amount to in scientific cases? In other words, 
the apparent differences between empirical and more formal cases of conceptual relativity 
seems in tension with Putnam’s suggestion that it represents a single, well-defined 
phenomenon. 
Second, Putnam wishes to distinguish the phenomenon of conceptual relativity from the 
acknowledgement of conceptual relativity. Putnam insists that it is possible that one might 
accept his description of a particular situation as an example of conceptual relativity without 
adopting the right kind of attitude as a result, but says very little about what he takes this 
extra acknowledgement to involve. It would seem that to see conceptual relativity in the right 
philosophical light requires more than simply assenting to a particular description of a 
situation – one must take seriously the implications that such conceptual conflicts have for 
certain (metaphysical) questions of correctness, facts, reality and so on. More than simply a 
set of particular phenomena, conceptual relativity in this sense appears more like a 
philosophical doctrine that emphasises the difficulty that certain situations create for a 
particular view of the world (i.e. Metaphysical Realism).  
The first and second chapters of this thesis will attempt to shed light on what might seem 
unclear about these two aspects of Putnam’s notion conceptual relativity. In the first case, we 
will suggest that Putnam’s representation of conceptual relativity as a narrow and specific 
phenomenon is somewhat misleading. Rather, we might distinguish several species of 
conceptual relativity that relate to notions of fact, equivalence and incompatibility in different 
ways. In thinking of conceptual relativity as a loosely related family of phenomena, we might 
make better sense of the relationship between the phenomenon of conceptual relativity and 
Putnam’s rejection of Metaphysical Realism. It is for this reason that while the notion of 
conceptual relativity might have its roots in references to ‘equivalent descriptions’ in 
scientific practice, many of Putnam’s more central cases involve the interplay of both formal 
and empirical concepts. 
In the second chapter, we will attempt to give a more developed sense to Putnam’s notion of 
acknowledging conceptual relativity in the right way. In doing so, we will examine several 
reactions to conceptual relativity that Putnam sees as denying the broader implications of the 
phenomena at hand, including those that insist on a ‘basic worldly dough’ (typified by 
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Boghossian) and Kant’s suggestion that the implications of such situations relate to our lack 
of knowledge rather than to any matter of the meaning of our concepts. We shall suggest that 
the problem with these reactions, on Putnam’s view, is that in one way or another they 
represent attempts to recognise conceptual relativity while retaining the notion that one of the 
descriptions at hand is the one that is, in some sense, metaphysically ‘serious’. For Putnam, 
the recognition of conceptual relativity is incompatible with the retention of such a notion, 
and it is this suggestion that best captures what the ‘acknowledgement’ of conceptual 
relativity amounts to. 
Having attempted to clarify some of Putnam’s thought on these two points, the third chapter 
of this thesis will respond to some prominent criticisms of Putnam’s notion of conceptual 
relativity. In doing so, we will bring to bear some of the observations developed in the 
preceding two chapters regarding the variety of situations of conceptual relativity and 
Putnam’s rejection of certain reactions to conceptual relativity. In particular Peter van 
Inwagen has presented two arguments that reject Putnam’s assessment of the implications of 
such situations in ways that seem problematic. Since his original move to internal realism, 
Putnam remained unwavering in his insistence that the phenomenon of conceptual relativity 
represented an insurmountable challenge to Metaphysical Realism. In clarifying some of the 
ambiguities that surround the notion of conceptual relativity and its implications, we might 
find ourselves in a better position to respond to those philosophers that wish to hold fast to 
some form of Metaphysical Realism in the face of the situations to which Putnam calls our 
attention. 
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1 
FLAVOURS OF CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY 
 
“When we examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what 
situations, we are looking not merely at words (or "meanings", whatever they may 
be) but also at the realities we use the words to talk about: we are using a 
sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, though not as the 
final arbiter of, the phenomena.”1 
J.L. Austin 
 
The task of arriving at an understanding of the notion of conceptual relativity is somewhat 
complicated by the fact that Putnam does not offer a general definition or characterisation of 
the notion. Rather, he assembles a myriad of examples from science, mathematics, and logic, 
attempting to sketch a picture of what it is that these various situations have in common. In 
both The Many Faces of Realism (1987) and Ethics Without Ontology (2004), Putnam’s 
flagship example of conceptual relativity is that of mereological sums in logic. The 
mereologist holds that for any two particulars, there is an object which consists of their sum, 
and so is inclined to suggest that a world of three individuals contains, in fact, seven objects 
(ignoring the ‘null object’). Naturally enough, this seems at odds with the traditional logical 
picture which would describe a universe of three individuals as containing three objects. 
Putnam’s suggestion is that this disagreement does not turn on any fact which remains to be 
discovered (or argued for), but rather on differences in the fundamental concepts of 
‘individual’ and ‘object’ that are employed in the expression of the disagreement in the first 
place.  
In addition to the example of mereological sums, Putnam cites a variety of other situations 
that he takes as instances of conceptual relativity. These include, amongst others, the 
ontological status of the Cartesian plane, the description of space-time as made up of points 
or limits, and the translation of field theory into particle theory. For Putnam, these situations 
are all broadly characterised not by genuine factual disagreement but by conflict between 
“ways of describing what are (in some way) the ‘same facts’ which are (in some way) 
‘equivalent’ but also (in some way) ‘incompatible’.”2 In other words, conceptual relativity 
refers to situations in which we can describe the same states of affairs in ways that are 
incompatible but equally true.  
In this chapter, we will examine several of these examples of conceptual relativity in some 
detail. In doing so, we will push upon the questions neatly suggested by Putnam’s turn of 
phrase above: in what way do the competing accounts describe the ‘same facts’? In what way 
                                                 
1 J.L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 57, no. 1 (1957): p. 12. 
2 Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism, p. 29. 
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are they ‘equivalent’? In what way are they ‘incompatible’? What we hope to highlight by 
focussing on such questions is that some of the examples of conceptual relativity put forward 
by Putnam may exhibit these characteristics in different ways. Establishing the equivalence 
of the two descriptions given by field theory and particle theory in quantum mechanics, for 
instance, might involve a great deal of empirical investigation that would seem misapplied in 
the mereological case. In the mereological case the incompatibility seems rather pronounced, 
in that we will give different answers to apparently simple questions such as ‘how many 
objects are there?’, depending on the description that we adopt. Yet in the case of the 
Cartesian plane, Putnam stresses the fact that the adoption of either of the competing 
descriptions does not impact the practice of mathematics in any meaningful way.  
In this way, we will arrive at a picture of conceptual relativity as a phenomenon that may 
manifest itself in a variety of ways depending on the context in which we find ourselves, and 
thus one that is more profitably viewed as a loosely related family of phenomena. Putnam’s 
interest in the phenomenon of conceptual relativity is primarily motivated by the challenge 
that it appears to present to Metaphysical Realism, and some of his proposed examples of 
conceptual relativity certainly bear this challenge out in a more direct fashion than others. In 
other words, some examples of conceptual relativity are more central to the case against 
Metaphysical Realism that Putnam wishes to present, and so it is worth examining what it is 
that connects these cases more intimately to this line of argument. In doing so, we will 
suggest that not everything that might seem like an example of conceptual relativity forms a 
particularly persuasive case against Metaphysical Realism, especially in cases where what is 
at stake is little more than the particular metaphysical gloss that we place on pursuits that 
seem practically equivalent. 
MEREOLOGY AND THE POLISH LOGICIAN 
In introducing the notion of mereological sums in The Many Faces of Realism, Putnam 
invites the reader to “consider ‘a world with three individuals’”, adding that “Carnap often 
used examples like this when we were doing inductive logic together in the early nineteen-
fifties.”3 The question is: how many objects are there in this world? The traditional logical 
picture, Putnam suggests, is that there are simply three objects in our world, in the sense that 
“we can identify ‘individual’, ‘object’, ‘particular’, etc., and find no absurdity in a world with 
just three objects which are independent, unrelated ‘logical atoms’.”4  
There are, however, alternative pictures available. Inspired by methods in mereology, the 
calculus of parts and wholes developed by Polish logician Stanisław Leśniewski, we might 
consider the ‘sum’ of any two objects to be a further object in its own right. On this view, our 
universe would contain more than three objects, since we must also recognise that the various 
combinations of our original three individuals are, themselves, objects. More explicitly, if X1, 
X2, and X3 are our three individuals, then on the mereological picture the list of objects in our 
world would also include X1 + X2, X1 + X3, X2 + X3, and X1 + X2 + X3. We might therefore 
                                                 
3 Ibid., p. 18. 
4 Ibid. 
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suggest that our ‘world with three individuals’ in fact contains seven objects (discounting the 
null object).
5
 
Putnam suggests that there is no deep factual disagreement in this situation. We may, if we 
would like to, “speak as Lezniewski taught us to speak – we can say that there are such things 
as mereological sums, we can tell which mereological sums are identical and which are not 
identical, we can say that mereological sums are not identical with sets, etc.”6 In other words, 
we can adopt the language of mereology, and in doing so we will find ourselves pushed to 
respond differently to fundamental questions about the situation at hand (such as ‘how many 
objects are there in this world?’ and ‘what are they?’). 
What we should not expect, on Putnam’s view, is that there will be any fact of the matter 
about which is the ‘correct’ way to describe the situation, or whether mereological sums 
‘actually’ exist. That is to say that it is “a matter of convention whether we say that 
mereological sums exist or not.” 7  By convention, Putnam means here merely that the 
question of whether mereological sums exist is left open by the structure of our natural 
language, and so we can simply decide to say either that mereological sums exist or that they 
do not. That is not to say that such a decision is made, as it were, once and for all. Rather, 
depending on our particular inquiry and its focus, emphasis, structure and so on, we might at 
different points decide (not) to adopt a mereological description of a particular situation. We 
are left, then, with the suggestion that “what logicians call ‘the existential quantifier’ […] and 
its ordinary language counterparts, the expressions ‘there are,’ ‘there exist’ and ‘there exists 
a,’ ‘some,’ etc., do not have a single absolutely precise use but a whole family of uses.”8 In 
short, neither the traditional logical description nor the mereological description can claim to 
occupy a metaphysically or factually privileged position with respect to our world of three 
individuals. 
We return then to some of our key questions. In what sense do the mereological and 
traditional logical pictures describe the ‘same facts’? Given the formal nature of the 
mereological case, this seems relatively uncomplicated. Both the Polish logician and the 
traditional logician recognise in this case that they are presented with a world with three 
individuals, before proceeding to give more conceptually-involved descriptions of the 
situation in terms of objects, existence, and so on. Were both logicians sitting at a table upon 
which sit three marbles, they would both agree on how many marbles there are on the table, 
but not on how many objects there are on the table.  
The sense in which we might consider the two descriptions to be ‘equivalent’ and 
‘incompatible’ in the mereological case appears slightly more complicated. Putnam refers to 
the descriptions in the mereological case, as well as those involved in other purported cases 
of conceptual relativity, as ‘cognitively equivalent’, by which he means both that the 
                                                 
5 More generally, this view would suggest that a world of n individuals would contain 2𝑛 − 1 objects. For any 
set X with cardinality n, there are 2𝑛 ways to combine the elements of that set (or more technically X has 2𝑛 
subsets). We must then subtract one if we do not want to count the null object corresponding to the empty subset 
of X (or the way of combining none of the elements of X). 
6 Putnam, Ethics without Ontology, p. 37. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
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descriptions do not differ in their ability to predict or explain the phenomena at hand, and that 
we are able to interpret the statements of one description in terms of the other. Given the 
debate between Putnam’s two hypothetical logicians operates at a reasonably abstract level, it 
is not clear that notions of prediction or explanation quite have the same traction that they 
might, for instance, in a scientific example of conceptual relativity. The mereologist might 
certainly be able to explain in some sense that there are different ways of determining how 
many objects are contained in such a world, but this certainly seems a different task to that of 
presenting some explanation of the phenomena at hand (i.e. our world of three individuals). 
There is not, it would seem, anything causal at stake. If merely asserting that there are seven 
objects in our world of three individuals is not to be considered an ‘explanation’ of the 
phenomena at hand, then it is not clear that there is anything about our world of three 
individuals that stands to be explained in this way. 
At least on some level, however, it does seem that we can translate between the two 
descriptions of our world with three individuals. When the traditional logician hears the 
mereologist say that there are seven objects in our world of three individuals, he or she might 
simply interpret this as the statement that the cardinality of the power set of our world of 
three individuals, minus the null object, is seven. That is to say that any statement that 
emerges from the mereological description can be understood as corresponding to a particular 
fact in the traditional logical description. In the sense that this correspondence between 
equivalent facts is not given by a formal translation scheme, we might characterise it as 
practical. In other words, while it might not be possible to derive some formal equivalence 
between the two descriptions, we can certainly practically interpret statements arising from 
one description in terms of the other. The mereological and traditional logical descriptions 
are equivalent, then, in the sense that we may translate between them on a practical level and 
neither allows us to better predict or explain the phenomena at hand (in the trivial sense that 
notions of explanation and prediction do not seem applicable to the mereological example as 
Putnam presents it).  
However, if the two descriptions strike us as cognitively equivalent, they also seem 
incompatible at least in a surface-level metaphysical sense. As previously noted, if asked to 
list the objects that are contained in our world of three individuals, the list produced by our 
mereologist would differ clearly from that produced by the traditional logician. In the sense 
that this disagreement revolves around a term of metaphysical import (i.e. object), the two 
descriptions are metaphysically incompatible. On a metaphysical level, the mereologist is 
prepared to count as objects things that the traditional logician simply would not. As Putnam 
observes, “the sum of my nose and the Eiffel Tower is regarded as a perfectly good object in 
mereology.”9  
In summary: we have two descriptions that begin from a common understanding of the 
situation at hand (the ‘same facts’), between which we can translate practically, if not 
formally, by way of interpretation (they are ‘equivalent’), but which diverge sharply in terms 
of the metaphysical picture they present (they are ‘incompatible’). In light of the observation 
that the two descriptions proceed from the same facts and are characterised by some form of 
                                                 
9 Ibid., p.36. 
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equivalence, Putnam suggests that the incompatibility of the two descriptions arises not 
because of a contradiction in terms of fact but because we find ourselves in a situation where 
the universe does not dictate a correct metaphysical use of the term ‘object’. 
GEOMETRY AND THE EUCLIDEAN PLANE 
Immediately following his presentation of the mereological example in The Many Faces of 
Realism, Putnam offers the dispute about the composition of the Euclidean plane as another 
instance of conceptual relativity. Concerning the points in the plane, Putnam asks: “Are these 
parts of the plane, as Leibniz thought? Or are they ‘mere limits’, as Kant said?”10 The 
Leibnizian might suggest that the Euclidean plane is made up of points, and that regions are 
mere collections of points, where the Kantian might argue that the Euclidean plane is really 
just a collection of regions, and that points only come in to play as limits involving regions 
(perhaps as the limit of a series of concentric discs of strictly decreasing radius, or as the 
intersection of convergent 2-dimensional balls – there are many ways to construe points as 
limits). 
In what sense do the Kantian and Leibnizian describe the ‘same facts’? In this case we are not 
considering particular individuals or objects, and so we do not seem obviously presented with 
a pool of common facts that each description might address. In the mereological case, we at 
least had our common world of three individuals, or three marbles on a table. When the 
Leibnizian and Kantian sit down to compare their descriptions, it is not clear what is on the 
table in front of them besides the concept of the Euclidean plane itself. At the very least, the 
Kantian and Leibnizian certainly have a common understanding of the Euclidean plane – how 
it is used, what it enables, how to draw and interpret it, and so on. We might say that they 
agree on a common understanding of the Euclidean plane that encompasses more or less 
everything except whether it is primitively made up of points or regions. This might include 
all of the facts that involve the Euclidean plane: facts about linear geometry, curves, tangents, 
and so on. But now we appear to have an incredibly broad notion of the sense in which the 
Leibnizian and Kantian describe the ‘same facts’, in the sense that we have suggested that 
their descriptions both address a common pool of facts made up of an understanding of the 
Euclidean plane and the sum total of true geometrical statements it involves. What emerges is 
that in this case the notion of ‘fact’ is not particularly relevant as far as it relates to what is at 
stake in these two competing descriptions.  
It is much easier to outline the sense in which the two descriptions might be considered 
‘equivalent’, however. To begin with, the descriptions in question seem ‘cognitively 
equivalent’ in the same way as the descriptions involved in the mereological case. They do 
not differ in predictive or explanatory force in a trivial sense because such (causal) notions 
are not in play, and we may easily translate from one to another. When the Leibnizian speaks 
of points, the Kantian can understand such talk as shorthand for some limit procedure, and 
when the Kantian speaks of limit procedures (instead of points), the Leibnizian may interpret 
this as a highly developed description of points.  
                                                 
10 Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism, p. 19. 
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Yet we might go further than ‘cognitive equivalence’. Despite the fact that the descriptions of 
the mereologist and the traditional logician are cognitively equivalent, they still produced 
statements that were incompatible on a theoretical level. The statements ‘there are seven 
objects in this world’ and ‘there are three objects in this world’ are not meta-statements but 
statements about the phenomena at hand, and they cannot both be asserted at once. Yet no 
such problem seems to arise in the case of the Euclidean plane. There are no statements 
within geometry whose truth value will fluctuate depending on whether one takes points as 
primitive or mere limits, nor do the competing descriptions produce statements within 
geometry that cannot be simultaneously asserted. We might say on this basis that the two 
descriptions are theoretically equivalent.  
As a result of this stronger theoretical equivalence, the purported incompatibility of the two 
descriptions seems much narrower. The two descriptions are incompatible in the sense that 
there are statements about the Euclidean plane and its constituent parts that seem to 
contradict each other. On the Leibnizian view, points are concrete objects and part of the 
Euclidean plane, whereas the Kantian insist that they are abstract entities of an entirely 
different kind. In this sense, the dispute between the Kantian and Leibnizian appears to 
revolve around the particular metaphysical gloss that we wish to place on the constructions 
that appear in our geometry, the practice of which remains unchanged regardless of which 
option we choose. 
CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY IN SCIENCE 
We next turn to the kind of example of conceptual relativity to which we referred at the 
beginning of this thesis – the scientific kind. As examples of conceptual relativity in scientific 
contexts, Putnam has at various points cited: electrons as waves or particles,
11
 the 
determination of systems at rest in special relativity,
12
 the matrix mechanics of Heisenberg 
and the wave mechanics of Schrödinger,
13
 and action between charged particles as mediated 
by ‘fields’ or by ‘point-source retarded potentials’.14 These examples are almost all highly 
technical, although a clear exposition of the particle/wave situation above is given by Putnam 
in ‘Mathematics Without Foundations’, where he writes: 
“The description of the world as a system of particles, not in the classical sense 
but in the peculiar quantum-mechanical sense, may be associated with a different 
picture than the description of the world as a system of waves, again not in the 
classical sense but in the quantum-mechanical sense; but the two theories are 
thoroughly intertranslatable, and should be viewed as having the same physical 
content. The same fact can be expressed either by saying that the electron is a 
wave with a definite wavelength x or by saying that the electron is a particle with 
a sharp momentum p and an indeterminate position. What 'same fact' comes to 
here is, I admit, obscure. Obviously what is not being claimed is synonymy of 
                                                 
11 Hilary Putnam, "Mathematics without Foundations," The Journal of Philosophy 64, no. 1 (1967): pp. 7-8. 
12  Hilary Putnam, "Equivalence," in Philosophical Papers: Realism and Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), pp. 33-34. 
13 Ibid., p. 40. 
14 Hilary Putnam, "A Reply to Jennifer Case," Revue International de Philosophie 55, no. 218 (2001): p. 432. 
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sentences. It would be absurd to claim that the sentence 'there is an electron-wave 
with the wavelength X' is synonymous with the sentence 'there is a particle electron 
with the momentum h/x and a totally indeterminate position'. What is rather 
being claimed is this: that the two theories are compatible, not incompatible, 
given the way in which the theoretical primitives of each theory are now being 
understood; that indeed, they are not merely compatible but equivalent: the 
primitive terms of each admit of definition by means of the primitive terms of 
the other theory, and then each theory is a deductive consequence of the other. 
Moreover, there is no particular advantage to taking one of the two theories as 
fundamental and regarding the other one as derived. The two theories are, so to 
speak, on the same explanatory level. Any fact that can be explained by means of 
one can equally well be explained by means of the other. And in view of the 
systematic equivalence of statements in the one theory with statements in the 
other theory, there is no longer any point to regarding the formulation of a given 
fact in terms of the notions of one theory as more fundamental than (or even as 
significantly different from) the formulation of the fact in terms of the notions of 
the other theory. In short, what has happened is that the systematic equivalences 
between the sentences of the two theories have become so well known that they 
function virtually as synonymies in the actual practice of science.”15 
Let us, therefore, take the above as our paradigm case of conceptual relativity in the scientific 
context, and consider how this might differ from the geometrical and mereological cases we 
have previously discussed. We might recall that in the geometrical and mereological 
contexts, articulating the sense in which the descriptions at hand dealt with the ‘same facts’ 
was relatively unproblematic. In the scientific context, this task is far more complex. It is 
easier to begin by saying what ‘same fact’ does not amount to. It does not amount to a simple 
re-coordination of definitions, in the sense that by simple formal redefinition of the primitive 
terms of one description we may seamlessly arrive at the facts of the other description. This is 
what Putnam refers to above as a ‘synonymy of sentences’, and roughly represents the 
positivist move attempted by Hans Reichenbach in The Philosophy of Space and Time,
16
 
generally considered to have been thwarted by Quine in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’.17 
We might also say that by ‘same facts’ we do not mean that, as in the mereological case, 
there is a common pool of facts to which we might assent on either description of the 
situation. In the case of electrons as particles or waves, we do not even have a shared set of 
‘observation sentences’ or something similar that we might identify as the core of some 
shared situational understanding. For the most part, there will be very little overlap between 
the wave and particle representations across descriptions of, for example, experimental 
observations or even theoretical conditions.  
Putnam does insist, however, that “the two theories are thoroughly intertranslatable, and 
should be viewed as having the same physical content.” 18  We might say, then, that in 
                                                 
15 Putnam, "Mathematics without Foundations," p. 8. 
16 Hans Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space and Time, trans. M. Reichenbach and J. Freund (New York: 
Dover Publications, 1958). 
17 See Willard Van Orman Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," The Philosophical Review 60(1951). 
18 Putnam, "Mathematics without Foundations," p. 8. 
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speaking of electrons as waves or as particles, we describe the ‘same facts’ in the sense that 
any fact about electrons that one might express in terms of waves in one theory can be re-
interpreted in terms of particles to play the same function in the other, and vice versa. They 
are not formally or semantically synonymous, as Reichenbach suggested, but they are 
practically synonymous. As assertions about the world, they communicate what can be 
practically interpreted as the same content, insofar as it is possible to translate between the 
two descriptions and in both cases say something that is empirically sound. In other words, 
the empirical dimension of scientific practice allows us to recognise that two descriptions 
represent ways of describing the ‘same facts’ in the absence of a literal shared body of facts 
in a way that we simply cannot in geometrical and logical contexts. 
This might seem similar to the sense in which we suggested that the descriptions in the 
Euclidean and mereological cases are ‘cognitively equivalent’. In the scientific context, the 
process of articulating what exactly the ‘same facts’ amounts to reflects directly on the sense 
in which the descriptions are equivalent or incompatible. In the mereological case, it was 
clear that there was a strictly shared body of facts from which both descriptions proceeded – 
the fact that the world contained three individuals. The questions of equivalence and 
incompatibility therefore seemed to pertain to questions of further interpretation or 
translation. Yet having suggested that the two descriptions of electrons both describe the 
‘same facts’ in the sense that we may interpret the statements of one as theoretical analogues 
of the other, we also seem to have captured the sense in which they are ‘equivalent’. We 
might say that in the scientific case, in sharp contrast to the mereological cases, the idea that 
two descriptions relate to the ‘same facts’ is not particularly distinct from the idea that they 
are ‘equivalent’.  
The scientific example of conceptual relativity contrasts with the other two cases in another 
way: the sense in which the descriptions are incompatible is somewhat more earthly. Treated 
as statements about the world, if we were to simply conjoin the wave and particle 
descriptions we would get an immediate contradiction. That is to say that the incompatibility 
arises at first glance, rather than at the point that we begin to give more meta-theoretical 
explanations of what the statements amount to (in the Euclidean case) or consider the relation 
of particular concepts of object to our formal scenario (in the mereological case). In short, we 
might say that in the scientific case, the sense in which the two descriptions present us with 
an instance of conceptual relativity is deeply tied to the empirical and practical 
intertranslatability of the theories, in the face of what looks to be an obvious contradiction.  
PENUMBRAL CASES 
What this all amounts to is a picture of the landscape of conceptual relativity that is far more 
complex than the one explicitly presented by Putnam. On this view, the various examples that 
Putnam cites are continuous enough with each other that we might meaningfully refer to 
them all as instances of conceptual relativity, while admitting of several loose 
subcategorisations. If an instance of conceptual relativity is roughly one in which we are 
presented with, in Putnam’s words, two “ways of describing what are (in some way) the 
‘same facts’ which are (in some way) ‘equivalent’ but also (in some way) ‘incompatible’”, 
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then we might say that the bracketed ‘in some way’ leaves room for the scientific, 
mereological and Euclidean cases to retain their own distinct flavour.
19
  
One result of the more complex picture of the landscape of conceptual relativity that we have 
presented in this chapter is that some ways of engaging with Putnam’s remarks on the matter 
begin to look somewhat fruitless. For instance, Decock and Douven attempt to use the 
mathematical apparatus of metric spaces
20
 to restate Putnam’s remarks in terms of distance 
metrics and formal threshold functions that provide necessary and sufficient conditions to 
determine whether or not a situation is a genuine example of conceptual relativity.
21
 In a 
similar vein, Horgan and Timmons look to ground the phenomenon of conceptual relativity 
in the semantics of contextually variable parameters that exhibit some form of ‘affirmatory 
conflict’.22 If these kinds of situations manifest a rather loose set of characteristics in different 
ways, and are united most saliently by a series of family resemblances (in a Wittgensteinian 
sense),
23
 then it seems unlikely that such rigid, formal approaches will add very much at all to 
our understanding of conceptual relativity. 
In describing situations of conceptual relativity, Putnam means to unsettle the Metaphysical 
Realist’s confidence that the fundamental concepts employed in the statement of facts about 
the world admit of a ‘uniquely right’ or ‘definitive’ sense. With this in mind, we might 
suggest that some of these flavours of conceptual relativity are far more central to the thrust 
of Putnam’s notion of conceptual relativity than others. The dispute between the Leibnizian 
and Kantian regarding the ontology of points, for instance, is so far removed from the 
practice of geometry that it pertains to little more than the kind of metaphysical gloss we 
wish to place on statements that involve the Euclidean plane. In this respect, Putnam’s 
insistence that there is no fact of the matter regarding whether the points of the Euclidean 
plane really exist seems to amount simply to an exhortation not to ask ontological questions 
in these cases. In fact, this is precisely what Putnam means to say – in the introduction of his 
(pointedly named) Ethics Without Ontology Putnam suggests that “the renewed (and 
continuing) respectability of Ontology […] has had disastrous consequences for just about 
every part of analytic philosophy.”24 
But such exhortations are only likely to have the impact that Putnam intends once the 
foundations have been unsettled. If we already take it that concepts such as ‘object’ and 
‘existence’ admit of a multitude of equally workable formulations, then it follows naturally 
                                                 
19 Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism, p. 29. 
20 In topology, a metric space is comprised of a set together with a metric that defines the distance between any 
elements in that set. The metric must satisfy certain axioms, and many sets can give rise to different metric 
spaces depending on the metric applied to them. 
21 Lieven Decock and Igor Douven, "Putnam’s Internal Realism: A Radical Restatement," Topoi 31, no. 1 
(2012). 
22 Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, "Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism," Noûs 36, no. 1 (2002). 
23 Discussing attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept of ‘game’, Wittgenstein 
remarks: “I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for 
the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. 
etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.” See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. 
P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, trans. P.M.S. Hacker, Joachim Schulte, and G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2009), §68. 
24 Putnam, Ethics without Ontology, p. 2. 
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that we should judge there to be no fact of the matter as to whether points exist or not. But if 
we have not yet accepted the notion that existence is not univocal, then it is not clear that the 
example of the Euclidean plane will give us any compelling reason to abandon such ground. 
The Metaphysical Realist might well accept that there is no fact of the matter in the case of 
the Euclidean plane without conceding that this acceptance must be extended to cases 
involving more fundamental concepts. In other words, the Metaphysical Realist might agree 
that a sort of relativity is sometimes at play in the somewhat abstract and axiomatic realm of 
Euclidean geometry, but insist that this relativity does not speak to whether or not we should 
think there to be a matter of fact about the application of the concepts of object and existence. 
As an example of conceptual relativity, the example of the Euclidean plane is isolated – there 
is very little at stake. 
The scientific case of conceptual relativity does not appear to fare much better in this task of 
unsettling what Putnam takes to be the central intuition of Metaphysical Realism. In a way, 
these scientific cases are too fluid and unstable. Enormous amounts of empirical work seem 
necessary to even verify that the descriptions address the same facts and are empirically 
equivalent. Moreover, it seems constantly possible that the apparent conflict might in fact be 
settled at some point in favour of one or other of the descriptions as the result of some fresh 
empirical breakthrough, at which point it would seem that they no longer qualify as examples 
of conceptual relativity. In other words, it seems that any purported scientific example of 
conceptual relativity may only be established as such according to present empirical inquiry. 
If Putnam’s aim is to push back against intuitions that concern such fundamental concepts as 
object and existence, it does not seem particularly helpful to invoke situations of conceptual 
relativity that revolve around equivalences that rely, as it were, on the winds of empirical 
fortune. 
CENTRAL CASES (THE POLISH LOGICIAN RETURNS) 
Fortunately for Putnam, however, not all of the flavours of conceptual relativity he presents 
appear so peripheral to the case he wishes to prosecute against Metaphysical Realism. In 
particular, it is his flagship example of mereological sums that seems most central to this 
task. In Representation and Reality, Putnam rephrases this examples of mereological sums in 
slightly more concrete terms. He imagines asking someone to count the objects in a room 
containing a chair, a table, a pen, a lamp and a notebook, and nothing else (aside from 
Putnam and his interlocutor, of course).
25
 Putnam’s companion first suggests that there are 
five objects in the room, and once queried about his decision not to include Putnam and 
himself in the count, amends his answer to seven. When asked about whether the pages of the 
notebook count as object, the interlocutor becomes less cooperative, but Putnam remains 
insistent: how many objects are in the room? 
Putnam suggests that a logician in this situation is likely to distinguish between an ordinary 
or metaphysical notion of an object “according to which, perhaps, the pages of the notebook 
are not ‘objects’ as long as they are still attached,” and a logical notion of an object as an 
                                                 
25 Hilary Putnam, Representation and Reality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), p. 111ff. 
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‘entity’, “according to which anything we can take as a value of a variable of quantification 
(anything we can refer to with a pronoun) is an ‘object’.”26 Something quite close to this 
logical notion is captured by Quine’s famous slogan: “to be is to be the value of a bound 
variable.”27  
Yet even if we simply agree to use such a logical notion, the task of counting the objects in 
the room still seems problematic. Suppose there are n elementary particles in the room. It 
seems at the very least that we have n objects, since we can refer to these particles and thus 
include them in variables of quantification. Putnam then asks: what about groups of 
elementary particles? We might count Putnam’s hand or his entire body as a mereological 
object, made up of elementary particles, but what of the object made up of his nose and the 
lamp? If we wish to insist with Husserl that, in fact, only certain ‘organic’ wholes are real 
objects, then we need to outline a criterion that distinguishes mereological sums that are 
objects from those that are not, and Putnam suggests that there is no clear way of drawing 
such a distinction. Aristotle, for instance, suggests that such a criterion might be that the parts 
stay together as the object moves, but lamp shades fall off and gum can find itself stuck to the 
side of a lamp – does that mean that either lamps are not objects or that the gum + lamp is? 
So it is that we might find ourselves saying: “Either you should consider only elementary 
particles to be objects, or you should allow arbitrary mereological objects.”28 
If we allow such arbitrary mereological objects, we will finally answer that there are 2
n 
objects in the room. If we insist that only ‘organic wholes’ count as objects, our answer will 
be a much smaller number. Which of these is right? On this point, Putnam suggests that: 
“To me it seems clear that the question is one that calls for a convention. As a 
layman might well put it, "It depends on what you mean by an object." But the 
consequence is startling: the very meaning of existential quantification is left 
indeterminate as long as the notion of an "object in the logical sense" is left 
unspecified. So it looks as if the logical connectives themselves have a variety of 
possible uses.”29  
Thus presented, the mereological example seems far more central to Putnam’s push against 
Metaphysical Realism than do the other two cases. In each of the cases of conceptual 
relativity that we have examined, we find that the world does not determine a unique version 
of the relevant concepts and so we may decide whether to adopt one or the other conceptual 
framework. Metaphysical realism, Putnam suggests, relies on the suggestion that there is no 
decision to be made (by us) regarding the application of the concept of object – such 
applications are right or wrong as matters of fact. In contrast to the case of the Euclidean 
plane, the mereological example strikes directly at the notion of a metaphysically privileged 
concept of object that Putnam takes to be at the heart of Metaphysical Realism. At the very 
least, then, there is something important at stake, whether or not you accept or deny the 
conclusions Putnam draws (or, indeed, his characterisation of the situation). On the other 
                                                 
26 Ibid., p. 111. 
27 Willard Van Orman Quine, "On What There Is," The Review of Metaphysics 2, no. 1 (1948): p. 33. 
28 Putnam, Representation and Reality, p. 112. 
29 Ibid., p. 113. 
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hand, this mereological example seems far less susceptible to changing empirical consensus 
than the scientific example. Of course, as Quine points out, when we invoke notions of 
convention or choice in these situations we are assuming a broad background of empirical 
facts.
30
 But this broad background of facts seems importantly different to the kind of 
empirical facts that are at issue in the course of ordinary scientific inquiry, if only in the sense 
that they are much further away from the frontier of our web of belief. 
We have argued in this chapter that if we understand the purpose of Putnam’s presentation of 
conceptual relativity as challenging the foundations of Metaphysical Realism as a cluster of 
views, then we ought to keep two things in mind. First, we should take note of the way in 
which the purported examples of conceptual relativity that Putnam musters do not form a 
homogenous, neat whole, but rather exhibit the core characteristics that Putnam outlines in a 
variety of ways. Second, we should treat the mereological example, amongst the others, as 
the case most central to Putnam’s philosophical agenda regarding Metaphysical Realism. 
There are, naturally, issues of tremendous mathematical, scientific and philosophical interest 
wrapped up in some of the other examples that Putnam presents, but his pronouncements on 
these examples are unlikely to seem particularly compelling unless one already sees the force 
of his argument on these points. For the most part, these pronouncements amount to 
exhortations against particular forms of philosophical activity, and it would seem generally 
that some form of conversion ought to precede preaching to the choir. In this sense, the 
mereological example carries the force of this metaphorical attempt at conversion, and so 
should be placed front and centre in our examination of conceptual relativity.
                                                 
30 This is one of the central points of Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’. See Quine, "Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism," p. 24. 
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2 
ACKNOWLEDGING CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY 
 
“Acknowledgment goes beyond knowledge. (Goes beyond not, so to speak, in 
the order of knowledge, but in its requirement that I do something or reveal 
something on the basis of that knowledge.)”1 
Stanley Cavell 
 
In Ethics Without Ontology, Putnam suggests that the notion of conceptual relativity 
encompasses more than simply assenting to a particular description of the kinds of situations 
we examined in the previous chapter. In this sense, Putnam writes that: 
“What I call ‘conceptual relativity’ is not the mere recognition that there are cases 
of this kind. After all, one might recognize that there are cases of this kind and 
do something analogous to what Kant did in the Second Antinomy; one might 
say that the question “Do mereological sums really exist?” is an antinomy, that 
the mind (which is allegedly unable to get down to ‘things as they are in 
themselves’) can’t know whether the question is appropriately conceived or not, 
and must tangle itself in contradiction if it tries to answer it. That attitude is not 
the attitude that I am calling ‘conceptual relativity’. Conceptual relativity, as I 
already indicated, holds that the question as to which of these ways of using 
‘exist’ (and ‘individual,’ ‘object,’ etc.) is right is one that the meanings of the words 
in the natural language, that is, the language that we all speak and cannot avoid 
speaking every day, simply leaves open.”2 
For Putnam, the notion of conceptual relativity encapsulates not only the recognition of the 
phenomenon of conceptual relativity, but the right kind of acknowledgement of the lessons 
we might learn from such situations. That is to say that to recognise a situation as an instance 
of conceptual relativity involves more than simply assenting to a particular description – it 
involves taking seriously the implications that such conceptual conflicts have for certain 
(metaphysical) questions of correctness, facts, reality and so on. On this view, to say that a 
particular disagreement is an instance of conceptual relativity is not merely to make an 
observation about the mere facts of the situation, but also involves the suggestion that there 
is, as it were, no fact of the matter that may legislate between particular uses of language in 
this instance. 
In this chapter, we will attempt to make sense of what it might be to acknowledge a situation 
as an instance of conceptual relativity, above and beyond “the mere recognition that there are 
                                                 
1 Stanley Cavell, "Knowing and Acknowledging," in Must We Mean What We Say? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969), p. 257. 
2 Putnam, Ethics without Ontology, p. 43. 
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cases of this kind.”3 This extra requirement might be made clearer when contrasted with 
certain reactions that Putnam sees as denying the conceptual relativity at play. It is not 
immediately clear, however, what entitles Putnam to use the language of denial and 
acknowledgement in these situations. Of course, philosophers very often believe that others 
who reject their point of view are denying or failing to acknowledge some important aspect 
of the phenomena at hand, but to some extent this seems par for the course insofar as 
philosophical disagreement is concerned. In short, we wish to ask: what is it about the kind of 
reactions that Putnam highlights that differentiates them from ordinary philosophical 
disagreements? Why is it that Putnam wishes to talk about the denial and acknowledgement 
of conceptual relativity, rather than merely the acceptance or non-acceptance of particular 
positions? 
In answering such questions, we will distinguish the ‘phenomenon’ of conceptual relativity 
from the ‘doctrine’ of conceptual relativity. The phenomenon of conceptual relativity is 
simply the particular description that Putnam gives of the situations we examined in the first 
chapter, whereas the doctrine of conceptual relativity is the set of implications that Putnam 
takes to follow from that description. In brief, we will suggest that what Putnam attempts to 
highlight by using the language of acknowledgement and denial is the way in which some 
philosophers that seek to demonstrate that the doctrine does not follow from the phenomenon 
of conceptual relativity eventually accomplish little more than endorsing an alternate 
description of the situations at hand. In other words, where such philosophers purport to 
accept the phenomenon of conceptual relativity in order to show that it does not necessarily 
give rise to the doctrine of conceptual relativity, their remarks reveal that they hold a view of 
the situations at hand which is incompatible with the description they original purport to 
accept.  
BOGHOSSIAN AND THE ‘BASIC WORLDLY DOUGH’ 
In Ethics Without Ontology, Putnam considers a ‘typical’ criticism of his interpretation of the 
mereological case of conceptual relativity. On this view, what Putnam highlights in his 
description of the mereological case is merely that there is a change of meaning in the terms 
involved. If the term ‘exist’ has the same meaning in the statement ‘there exists an object 
which is the mereological sum of X1, X2, and X3’ and ‘there does not exist an object which is 
the mereological sum of X1, X2, and X3’, then contrary to Putnam’s suggestion the two 
descriptions simply do contradict each other in fact. If there is no contradiction here, as 
Putnam suggests, then the mereologist and the traditional logician must be using the word 
‘exist’ in different ways. On this view, what the traditional logician means by ‘there exists’ is 
something like ‘there exists something that is not a mereological sum’. In other words, the 
traditional logician is quantifying over a restricted universe of discourse that does not include 
mereological sums. That is to say that the meaning of their respective uses of the phrase 
‘there exists’ differs not in the underlying concept that they employ (as Putnam would 
suggest) but in the domain to which they are applying a common concept of ‘existence’. 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
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What this reaction to the notion of conceptual relativity (at least insofar as it relates to the 
mereological examples) wishes to protect is the notion that there might remain an invariant, 
correct concept of ‘existence’ (or ‘object’) which might in certain circumstances be applied to 
larger or smaller domains of discourse. That is to say that this view pushes back against 
Putnam’s suggestion that concepts such as ‘existence’ pull together a whole family of uses 
and notions which might differ or provoke conflicts in various situations. The problem with 
such reactions, as Putnam points out, is that such an interpretation of the situation is not quite 
as ‘neutral’ as it might appear at first glance. To say that the traditional logician ‘does not 
include’ mereological sums in the universe over which she quantifies is to suggest that, in 
some sense, there are mereological sums, but that the traditional logician does not pay them 
any mind when she considers existence claims about objects. This is already a partisan 
description of the situation, offered from the point of view of our hypothetical mereologist. 
We might offer a similarly partisan description from the point of view of the traditional 
logician by suggesting that there are no such objects as mereological sums, but that the 
mereologist is merely applying the same notion of existence to a broader universe of 
discourse – one that roughly corresponds to the power set of whatever universe the traditional 
logician considers. 
The point here is that this attempt to diffuse the force of Putnam’s notion of conceptual 
relativity through talk of ‘differences in meaning’ simply amounts to adopting one or the 
other way of speaking on a fundamental level. In suggesting that the traditional logician 
simply does not ‘include’ mereological sums in her ontology, it might seem that we have 
preserved some notion of ‘existence’ as a single concept – after all, we now appear to have a 
situation in which the mereologist and traditional logician are both applying an identical 
concept of existence (or at the very least of existential quantification), merely over more or 
less inclusive sets of objects. Yet in order to interpret the mereological situation in this way, 
we are forced to assume that there simply are mereological sums in some sense, or 
conversely that there are not mereological sums. In other words, what might look at first 
glance like an explanation of the phenomenon of conceptual relativity that preserves the idea 
of a definitive notion of existence appears rather as a denial of conceptual relativity, insofar 
as it requires that we assume that one or the other description is correct in the first place. 
In Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism, Paul Boghossian offers a 
similar reaction to Putnam’s comments on conceptual relativity. Boghossian considers 
Putnam’s use of the example of mereological sums as an attempt to demonstrate the 
description-dependence of facts. Boghossian agrees with Putnam’s suggestion that the 
incompatibility between the descriptions is only apparent, in the sense that they “no more 
contradict each other than my saying that there are eight people at the party contradicts my 
saying that there are four couples at that very same party.”4 Yet he rejects the idea that this 
observation entails that the facts in our mereological situation are relative to our particular 
concept of object, since:  
                                                 
4  Paul Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2006), p. 37. 
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“[…] for any such example to work, we need to start with some basic facts—for 
example, that there are three circles—that we can then truthfully redescribe in a 
variety of different ways. Given that the little world contains three circles, we can 
then introduce a notion of ‘‘object’’ on which it is true to say that there are three 
objects, and a different notion of ‘‘object’’ on which it is true to say that there are 
seven objects or nine objects or whatever.  
But for this sort of strategy of redescription to make sense, it must be assumed 
that there are some basic facts—the basic worldly dough—on which our 
redescriptive strategies can get to work.”5 
In other words, these different notions of object are merely two ways of slicing the same 
otherwise invariant “basic worldly dough”. By conceding that our concept of object may be 
extended in different and superficially incompatible ways, Boghossian hopes to protect the 
notion of a common set of independent facts that underpins these differences (i.e. a basic 
worldly dough). 
Yet this might prompt the question: what is this dough made up of? That is, what are the 
parts of this dough? If the answer in the mereological case is simply that the parts of the 
dough are X1, X2, X3, X1 + X2, X1 + X3, X2 + X3, and X1 + X2 + X3, then we appear simply to 
be in the same situation we found ourselves previously, in that we have committed to a 
partisan description of the situation. In other words, if the basic worldly dough in this case 
consists of the fact that ‘there exist’ three circles (to use Boghossian’s presentation) and that 
the mereologist then ‘combines’ those circles and refers to the resulting arrangements as 
objects, then in describing our worldly dough we appear to have already taken the side of the 
traditional logician. Conversely, if our basic worldly dough includes the mereological sums 
in question then it appears that we have already settled the question of their existence in 
favour of the mereologist – the traditional logician, then, simply does not count them as 
objects for her purposes.  
In describing an initial set of basic, description-independent facts, it seems clear that 
Boghossian has in mind the first case, where the worldly dough amounts to the fact “that 
there are three circles.” After accepting Putnam’s presentation of situations of conceptual 
relativity, Boghossian employs the dough-slicing metaphor in order to stifle Putnam’s 
emphasis on the point that “there is no fact of the matter how many objects there are in this 
word.”6 Boghossian argues that since situations of conceptual relativity involve descriptions 
which are underpinned by a common, description-neutral set of facts, there is no reason to 
think that the notion of a fixed sense of object is under threat. Yet as we have seen, this 
common pool of facts is not description-neutral in the way that Boghossian might imagine. 
We might say then that Boghossian’s reaction is problematic insofar as it is inconsistent: it 
purports to recognise the sense in which the two descriptions do not conflict, but in doing so 
insists upon a basic worldly dough of facts that implicitly paints one of the descriptions as 
correct. 
                                                 
5 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
6 Ibid., p. 36. 
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At this point, Boghossian might ask: how is the notion of a basic worldly dough any different 
from the idea that the two logicians describe the ‘same facts’, as you suggested in the first 
chapter? In other words, if one of the requirements for situations of conceptual relativity is 
that the two ways of speaking describe (in some sense) the ‘same facts’, then why can we not 
simply say that this basic worldly dough is made out of whatever these ‘same facts’ are? 
There is a difference, however, between suggesting that the two descriptions address some 
shared pool of facts and that the descriptions are underpinned by an external set of facts 
which they both merely attempt to redescribe. In the first chapter, we suggested that the 
apparent conflict between the mereologist and traditional logician was made possible in part 
by the fact that there was some degree of factual overlap between the two descriptions, 
whether phrased in terms of individuals, logical atoms, mereological simples, and so on. 
Boghossian’s suggestion extends beyond this, to the notion that the mereologist and the 
traditional logician are engaged simply in the project of redescribing some worldly dough 
that is external and antecedent to the two descriptions at hand. Where we suggested that there 
were simply two separate descriptions that made reference to the same facts, Boghossian 
suggests that the two descriptions in some sense arise from a description-neutral, external 
worldly dough. In this sense, there seems to be a clear distinction between Boghossian’s talk 
of worldly dough and the notion of the ‘same facts’ that we employed in the previous chapter. 
TARGETING IMPLICATIONS 
What is it about such reactions to the phenomenon of conceptual relativity that entitles 
Putnam to describe them in particular as a denial, rather than simply as mistaken, 
unpersuasive or misunderstood? It would seem that there are two ways in which the 
Metaphysical Realist might go about resisting the notion that conceptual relativity represents 
a substantial challenge to their picture: they might dispute Putnam’s description of the 
phenomena at hand, or they might accept Putnam’s description and contend that it does not 
carry the implications he suggests. We might call the first reaction a ‘denial’ of conceptual 
relativity in the rather obvious sense that in reacting this way the Metaphysical Realist denies 
that there is such a phenomenon as conceptual relativity, at least as Putnam describes it. But 
this kind of denial of conceptual relativity is, at least for our purposes, rather superficial – it 
merely asserts that Putnam is mistaken about some detail or other of the situations he 
describes, whether they be mathematical, scientific or logical. At the very least it is certainly 
not what Putnam means when he says that the metaphor of a basic worldly dough “denies 
(rather than explaining) the phenomenon of conceptual relativity.”7 
Insofar as the target of the sort of philosophical reaction highlighted above is not Putnam’s 
description of the phenomenon of conceptual relativity but rather the implications he draws 
from his description of the phenomenon, the reactions we have examined take the second of 
the two above routes. In objecting to Putnam’s use of conceptual relativity as a challenge to 
Metaphysical Realism, Boghossian’s strategy above was to by and large accept Putnam’s 
description of conceptual relativity and demonstrate that, in fact, we can only make sense of 
such a phenomenon by assuming the existence of a basic, invariant worldly dough. It is not 
                                                 
7 Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism, p. 34. 
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the phenomenon of conceptual relativity that is the target of such a challenge, but rather the 
suggestion that such a phenomenon creates difficulties for the Metaphysical Realist by 
undermining the notion of a metaphysically privileged concept of ‘object’ or ‘existence’. 
How might we understand the deeper sense in which Putnam takes some of these reactions as 
denying the phenomenon of conceptual relativity? At the very least, it does not seem that 
every attempt at undermining the implications that Putnam draws from the phenomenon of 
conceptual relativity ought to be considered a denial, properly speaking. Both the reaction 
considered by Putnam and the one offered by Boghossian purport to recognise the 
phenomenon of conceptual relativity more or less as Putnam presents it, specifically in the 
sense that the descriptions at hand do not conflict in any deep sense. Yet in attempting to 
combat the implications of such a presentation of conceptual relativity, both Boghossian and 
Putnam’s hypothetical objector seem to rely on a picture of the phenomenon at hand in which 
one of the descriptions is implicitly correct or more fundamental. 
We might say that such reactions constitute a denial of conceptual relativity in the sense that 
while they purport to accept Putnam’s description of conceptual relativity (the premise) in 
order to attack his comments on the concepts of object and existence (the implication), they 
do so on the basis of a redescription of the situation at hand in which one of the descriptions 
is assumed implicitly to be correct. As we saw, Boghossian’s suggestion that the descriptions 
are simply different ways of slicing the same basic worldly dough leaves us with the 
question: what is this dough made up of? Does it, for instance, include mereological sums or 
not? In either case, it seems that one of the descriptions is taken implicitly to be the correct or 
definitive one, on which the other is merely derivative. It is this view that gives rise to the 
suggestion that mereological sums are simply not included in the ontology of the traditional 
logician, or that the basic worldly dough consists of the fact that there are ‘simply’ three 
circles (and not their mereological combinations) which the mereologist then proceeds to 
combine to form more objects.  
In either case, what is invoked in the defence of Metaphysical Realism (specifically the 
notion of a metaphysically privileged notion of object and existence) is a picture of 
conceptual relativity that does not accord particularly well with the presentation of the 
phenomenon that the objector purports to accept. In this sense, it seems fitting to call such a 
reaction a denial of conceptual relativity in that it amounts to a redescription of the situations 
at hand, and so does not succeed in attacking the implications that Putnam draws on the basis 
of the phenomenon. Rather, it amounts to a more sophisticated form of the first kind of denial 
described at the beginning of this section. In attempting to argue that Putnam’s presentation 
of conceptual relativity does not present a meaningful case against certain key tenets of 
Metaphysical Realism, reactions of the kind we have discussed rely on a picture of the 
phenomenon that directly conflicts with Putnam’s.  
THE KANTIAN REACTION 
Another reaction to the phenomenon of conceptual relativity that Putnam wishes to avoid is 
one inspired by Kant’s treatment of his four antinomies in the Critique of Pure Reason. These 
antinomies are collections of theses and antitheses that Kant takes at the same time to be 
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contradictory and equally rational.
8
 In the case of the second antinomy, Kant considers the 
thesis that every composite substance is made up of simple parts (and so all that exists is the 
simple and what is composed of the simple), and its antithesis that no composite substance is 
made up of simple parts (on which view there do not exist any properly simple objects).
9
 In 
the face of this antinomy of reason, Kant suggests that the answer belongs to the ‘noumenal’ 
world as a fact about things-in-themselves, and therefore is beyond the rational capacities of 
the human mind.
10
  
On Putnam’s view, the problem with such a reaction to the phenomenon of conceptual 
relativity is that it clings to the notion that, on some level or other, there is a fact of the matter 
regarding whether mereological sums do or do not exist. Where the ‘dough-slicing’ metaphor 
appears to implicitly suggest either that mereological sums do or do not exist by tacitly 
endorsing one description or the other, the Kantian reaction explicitly states that the world-in-
itself legislates a fact of the matter, even though the limits of human reason may prevent us 
from discovering whether the traditional logician or the Polish logician is right. In short: this 
hypothetical Kantian accepts Putnam’s description of the mereological case of conceptual 
relativity but also insists that, as a matter of ding an sich, one of the two descriptions is the 
correct one.  
Where the Kantian holds that we simply cannot know whether mereological sums are objects 
or not, Putnam insists that there is no fact to be known in this case. Discussing Carnap’s 
comments on such examples, Putnam remarks that “his attitude to such questions was the one 
I recommend here, that this is a question of the adoption of a convention, and not a question 
of fact.”11 On Putnam’s view, the Kantian response represents a sort of skepticism in the face 
of these ontological disputes that does not take into account the sense in which these disputes 
revolve around conceptual conventions more than they do around facts. While the Kantian 
reaction avoids the more straightforward difficulties we associated with reactions such as 
Boghossian’s, Putnam insists that Kant retains too fixed (or metaphysical) a notion of 
‘object’ in the phenomenal world, relying as he does on the construction of forms of intuition 
and categories.  
The conflict between Putnam and Kant on this point relates also to the former’s insistence on 
the adoption of the ‘agent point of view’ in philosophy. Putnam takes the notion of the agent 
point of view to lie at the heart of the pragmatism of both William James and John Dewey, in 
the sense that they insisted on “the supremacy of the agent point of view. If we find that we 
must take a certain point of view, use a certain ‘conceptual scheme,’ when we are engaged in 
practical activity, in the widest sense of ‘practical activity,’ then we must not simultaneously 
advance the claim that it is not really ‘the way things are in themselves.’”12 In other words, 
Putnam aims to do justice to the full normative demands of the practice he is attempting to 
study, and so is not interested in engaging in rational reconstruction of our practice according 
                                                 
8 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1929), 
A466/B94. 
9 Ibid., A467/B95. 
10 Ibid., A466/B94. 
11 Putnam, Ethics without Ontology, p. 137, footnote 6. 
12 Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism, p. 69. 
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to certain theoretical desiderata. For Putnam, to suggest that our practice (in the broadest 
possible sense) leaves open the question of whether or not mereological sums exist but that 
there must be some answer to the question as a matter of ‘things-in-themselves’ is to adopt a 
picture that does nothing but give us a kind of metaphysical comfort. 
THE DOCTRINE OF CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY 
For our purposes, what is important about the Kantian reaction is not necessarily its viability, 
since few modern defenders of Metaphysical Realism explicitly adopt the kind of skepticism 
that it involves. Rather, the Kantian reaction throws into sharp relief what Putnam at different 
points refers to as the doctrine of conceptual relativity. Unlike the dough-slicing reaction, 
Putnam does not describe the Kantian reaction as a denial of conceptual relativity, since the 
Kantian reaction does not seem inconsistent in the way that the dough-slicing metaphor does. 
Rather, the Kantian rejects the lessons that Putnam wishes to draw from the examples of 
conceptual relativity. In this sense, we might say that the Kantian accepts the phenomenon of 
conceptual relativity as presented, but does not acknowledge what we might describe as the 
doctrine of conceptual relativity. Putnam summarises this doctrine in the preface to Realism 
with a Human Face, where he writes that: 
“The doctrine of conceptual relativity, in brief, is that while there is an aspect of 
conventionality and an aspect of fact in everything we say that is true, we fall into 
hopeless philosophical error if we commit a ‘fallacy of division’ and conclude 
that there must be a part of the truth that is the ‘conventional part’ and a part 
that is the ‘factual part.’”13 
While the Kantian reaction does not seem to deny the phenomenon of conceptual relativity, 
neither the Kantian nor the Metaphysical Realist in the style of Boghossian accept the 
doctrine of conceptual relativity. Both reactions push back against Putnam’s suggestion that 
“notions of ‘object’ and ‘existence’ are not treated as sacrosanct, as having just one possible 
use.”14  
On Putnam’s view, the philosopher who denies conceptual relativity in the way that we have 
described goes some distance towards recognising that the notions of existence and object 
can be employed in a variety of ways that are perfectly consonant with the rules of formal 
logic. Where such a philosopher errs, however, is in the fact that they “accept this idea, and 
then go on to single out one use of the existential quantifier […] as the only metaphysically 
serious one.”15 While Boghossian does not necessarily adjudicate one way or the other, the 
notion of a basic description-independent worldly dough implies that one of the descriptions 
(or perhaps a third) is somehow definitive or correct. As has been suggested, such a reaction 
misfires quite tangibly, in the sense that implicitly treating one of the descriptions as 
metaphysically serious in the first place amounts to a redescription of the phenomenon of 
conceptual relativity rather than a genuine challenge to its implications. 
                                                 
13 Hilary Putnam, Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. x. 
14 Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism, p. 35. 
15 Ibid. 
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The Kantian reaction is far more explicit in its rejection of the doctrine of conceptual 
relativity, since it is rooted in the notion that the fact of the matter in such situations is simply 
inaccessible to the human mind. In this sense, the Kantian attempts to preserve the notion 
“that at least one Category – the ancient category of Object or Substance – has an absolute 
interpretation.” 16  Putnam’s dispute with the Kantian on this front runs much deeper to 
questions of criteria and conceptual schemes, since: 
“What is wrong with the notion of objects existing ‘independently’ of conceptual 
schemes is that there are no standards for the use of even the logical notions 
apart from conceptual choices.”17 
Nonetheless, the continuities and discontinuities between the Kantian reaction and the so-
called denial of conceptual relativity do serve to highlight two things. First, the Kantian 
represents someone who accepts the phenomenon of conceptual relativity in a consistent 
fashion, while rejecting the doctrine outright. This contrasts with a philosopher like 
Boghossian, who claims to accept an account of the phenomenon conceptual relativity while 
rejecting the associated doctrine, but in fact simply denies Putnam’s account in the first place. 
Second, we see how fundamental the dispute between Putnam and the Kantian is, in the sense 
that the doctrine of conceptual relativity amounts on Putnam’s view to the “renunciation of 
the notion of the ‘thing in itself’.”18  
As a result, we have a clearer view of the landscape. We find ourselves in a position to 
narrow down the challenges to Putnam’s notion of conceptual relativity that might turn out to 
be most compelling. Such a challenge should avoid painting conceptual relativity as a simple, 
unified phenomenon, or at least ought to focus on the cases most central to Putnam’s 
philosophical focus. In addition, it is important that the objection neither devolve into a 
superficial denial of conceptual relativity, nor run so deep so as to concern noumena and ding 
an sich (if only because very few modern defenders of Metaphysical Realism are willing to 
commit themselves to that kind of approach). That is not to say that there are not fruitful 
philosophical conversations to be had on such fronts, but rather it is to suggest that the thrust 
of Putnam’s use of the phenomenon of conceptual relativity is aimed squarely at 
Metaphysical Realism, and that the Kantian focus on things in themselves might make the 
dispute seem more foundational and intractable than it otherwise is. In the final chapter that 
follows, we shall present and engage with some responses to Putnam on the topic of 
conceptual relativity that appear to navigate the two challenges we have outlined in this 
chapter
                                                 
16 Ibid., p. 36. 
17 Ibid., p. 35-36. 
18 Ibid., p. 36. 
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3 
DEFENDING CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY 
 
“But my view is not a view in which the mind makes up the world (or makes it 
up subject to constraints imposed by ‘methodological canons’ and mind-
independent ‘sense-data’). If one must use metaphorical language, then let the 
metaphor be this: the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world.”1 
Hilary Putnam 
 
It might prove useful to summarise the terrain we have covered up until now. We have seen 
in the first chapter that Putnam presents various examples of conceptual relativity as 
challenges to what he takes to be a core assumption of Metaphysical Realism, and that these 
examples relate to each other in a more complex way than Putnam has generally suggested. 
As a result, we suggested that reactions to Putnam’s remarks on conceptual relativity that 
attempted to provide strict criteria for situations of conceptual relativity in full generality 
were unlikely to be particularly helpful in assessing Putnam’s challenge to Metaphysical 
Realism. We then examined some further reactions to conceptual relativity, and suggested 
that those such as Boghossian’s amounted more to a denial of the phenomenon of conceptual 
relativity than a refutation of Putnam’s challenge to Metaphysical Realism. Although the 
Kantian reaction does not fit into this category, we suggested that it denies explicitly what the 
reactions previously considered deny implicitly. That is, it does not attempt to explain away 
conceptual relativity but in some sense embraces it head on, relegating any knowledge about 
such situations to the noumenal world. 
We might ask, however: what exactly is it about the implications that Putnam draws from the 
phenomenon of conceptual relativity that threatens Metaphysical Realism? We recall that for 
Putnam, Metaphysical Realism boils down to the idea that the facts of the world (or the truth 
of propositions) are fixed by something mind-independent and language-independent, and 
that this presupposes a fixed and metaphysically-privileged notion of object.
2
 Roughly, 
Putnam suggests that if you wish to speak of language-independent or mind-independent 
facts, you need some way of settling definitive versions of the concepts that are going to 
allow the articulation of these facts. The task of arriving (discovering) such definitive 
versions of the concepts at play seems deeply problematic in light of the phenomenon of 
conceptual relativity, and as a result Putnam suggests that Metaphysical Realism as a whole 
becomes untenable. 
                                                 
1 Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. xi. 
2 There has been some disquiet on this front, with some defenders of Metaphysical Realism suggesting that they 
are not necessarily committed to the kind of metaphysically-privileged notion of object that Putnam suggests. 
See George Alfred Wrisley, "Realism and Conceptual Relativity" (University of Iowa, 2008). 
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In recent years, Peter van Inwagen has taken issue with Putnam’s presentation of conceptual 
relativity on the basis of two distinct arguments. First, van Inwagen holds that the close 
connection between the concept of number and the concept of being, along with the notion 
that being and existence are identical, suggests that the concept of existence is univocal – it 
means the same thing even when applied to radically different kinds of objects.
3
 Second, van 
Inwagen argues that mereology presents one theory of parts, wholes and objects amongst 
many, and that the disagreement that plays out between these theories is serious and 
reasoned. In this sense, van Inwagen argues that the descriptions in the mereological case do 
not merely appear incompatible but in fact are “as incompatible as ‘a world that contains 
immaterial souls’ and ‘a world that contains only material things.’”4 
As reactions to Putnam’s presentation of Metaphysical Realism, neither of these arguments 
seem to qualify as the kind of denial of conceptual relativity examined in the previous 
chapter. In the first case, van Inwagen grants Putnam’s presentation of the phenomenon of 
conceptual relativity and attempts to show that it does not present us with a compelling 
reason to think that the concept of existence is not univocal. This might seem similar to the 
strategy employed by Boghossian, which did appear to count as the kind of denial of 
conceptual relativity that Putnam had in mind. For now, though, it will suffice to note that 
van Inwagen does not try to argue against the implications drawn by Putnam on the basis of a 
redescription of the phenomenon of conceptual relativity, and so does not fall into the kind of 
inconsistency that characterised Boghossian’s attempt. In the second case, van Inwagen 
rejects Putnam’s characterisation of the phenomenon of conceptual relativity in the 
mereological case from the very start, especially as far as Putnam’s comments on the 
incompatibility of the two descriptions are concerned.  
Where the first two chapters of this thesis were dedicated to elaborating a more nuanced view 
of the phenomenon of conceptual relativity and dealing with some reactions to Putnam’s 
comments on the matter that, for different reasons, do not form genuine challenges to his 
view, this final chapter will be dedicated to dealing with some challenges that are not so 
easily dismissed as denials or misunderstandings. The two arguments offered by van Inwagen 
present distinct and substantial challenges to Putnam’s use of the phenomenon of conceptual 
relativity, and as such outlining and responding to them will be the main focus of this 
chapter.  
VAN INWAGEN ON BEING AND NUMBER 
In ‘Being, Existence and Ontological Commitment’, Peter van Inwagen seeks to defend an 
essentially Quinean view of ontology.
5
 Van Inwagen presents this Quinean meta-ontology in 
the form of five theses, the second and third of which are particularly relevant for our 
                                                 
3 Peter van Inwagen, "Being, Existence and Ontological Commitment," in Metametaphysics: New Essays on the 
Foundations of Ontology, ed. David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2008), pp. 476ff. 
4 Peter van Inwagen, "The Number of Things," Philosophical Issues 12, no. 1 (Realism and Relativism) (2002): 
p. 193. 
5  As van Inwagen very straightforwardly says; “the meta-ontology presented in this essay is essentially 
Quine’s.” van Inwagen, "Being, Existence and Ontological Commitment," p. 476. 
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purposes. The first thesis is that being is not an activity – that is to say, not something that 
things actively do. In articulating this, van Inwagen uncharacteristically quotes J. L. Austin, 
who said of existence that “the word is a verb, but it does not describe something that things 
do all the time, like breathing, only quieter—ticking over, as it were, in a metaphysical sort of 
way.”6 The second meta-ontological thesis that van Inwagen presents is that being is the same 
as existence. That is to say that “in general, to say that things of a certain sort exist and to say 
that there are things of that sort is to say the same thing.”7 As a result of this second thesis, 
van Inwagen rejects both the suggestion that there are things that do not exist and the notion 
that only physically or spatially extended objects exist.
8
  
This second thesis flows neatly into van Inwagen’s third: existence is univocal. Van Inwagen 
frames this thesis in opposition to the notion that when the concept of existence is applied to 
agreements and causal links it means something different from what it means when applied to 
tangible objects. Although attractive, van Inwagen declares that this suggestion is false, and 
goes on to offer an argument that he claims “will show why it is, if not false, then at least not 
obviously true.”9 Van Inwagen borrows from Frege the notion that the concepts of existence 
and number are closely related. In the Foundations of Arithmetic, Frege suggests that 
“existence is analogous to number. Affirmation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of 
the number zero.”10 Yet, van Inwagen does not hold fast to Frege’s suggestion that existence 
is a ‘second-level’ predicate of concepts rather than objects, clarifying that “when I say that 
affirmation of existence is denial of the number zero, I mean only that to say that Fs exist is 
to say that the number of Fs is not zero.”11  
On van Inwagen’s view, this connection between the concepts of number and existence 
provides a firm basis for the suggestion that existence is a univocal concept. Where Gilbert 
Ryle argues that it would seem a strange joke indeed to say “that there exist prime numbers 
and Wednesdays and public opinions and navies; or that there exist both minds and bodies,”12 
van Inwagen insists that there is nothing about these various uses of exist that suggests that 
the concept is applied in any significantly different fashion, since there is nothing about the 
concept of number that differs in its application to plays or houses or prime numbers. In each 
case, the application of the concept of existence amounts to the statement that the number of 
navies, prime numbers, Wednesdays, and so on, is not zero.  
With all of the above machinery in place, van Inwagen turns to Putnam’s argument. In doing 
so, van Inwagen is happy to grant Putnam the premise that debates about whether there are 
mereological sums are in some sense futile, but does not accept Putnam’s suggestion that this 
carries further implications for the notion of existence, on the basis that he does not see “how 
                                                 
6 J.L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 68. 
7 van Inwagen, "Being, Existence and Ontological Commitment," p. 480. 
8 Ibid., p. 481. 
9 Ibid., p. 482. 
10 Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J.L. Austin (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1960 [1884]), 
p. 65. 
11 van Inwagen, "Being, Existence and Ontological Commitment," p. 483. 
12 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1948), p. 23. 
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the meaning of ‘there is’ can possibly be ‘extended by convention’.”13 To understand the 
thrust of van Inwagen’s objection here, it will be helpful to quote him at length. 
“Suppose one is contemplating extending the meaning of a term by adopting new 
conventions governing its use; let’s say that one is contemplating extending the 
meaning of ‘person’ in such a way that corporations are to be called ‘persons’. 
One will, presumably, contemplate such a thing only if one believes that there is 
at least one corporation for ‘person’ to apply to. Similarly (I should think) one 
will contemplate extending the meaning of ‘there is’ in such a way that ‘there is’ 
applies to sums only if one believes that there is at least one sum for ‘there is’ to 
apply to. But if one thinks that there is a sum (or number or universal) for ‘there 
is’ to apply to, one already thinks that ‘there is’ applies to at least one sum 
(number, universal), and the purpose of the contemplated convention has 
therefore been accomplished antecedently to adopting it. […] A single, ‘fixed in 
advance’ meaning for ‘there is’ (Putnam in several places describes the thesis he 
opposes as the thesis that there is a single, ‘fixed in advance’ meaning for ‘there 
is’) seems to be a presupposition of any attempt to extend the meaning of any 
term by convention: you need a fixed-in-advance sense of ‘there is’ to express 
your belief (a belief you must have if you are contemplating such a convention) 
that the class of ‘new’ things that the term is to apply to is not empty.”14 
In other words, van Inwagen suggests that if we view statements about the existence of sums 
as denials that the number of sums is zero, then it is difficult to see in what sense one might 
‘extend’ the concept of existence to a particular kind of object, since in doing so one must 
already implicitly think that there is an object of this kind (and therefore that such objects 
exist). The question, van Inwagen suggests, is settled before we can even ask it (or perhaps in 
our asking it). 
In defence of Putnam on this point, we might suggest that several aspects of van Inwagen’s 
approach seem suspect. Van Inwagen suggests that since the concept of number is univocal, 
the close connection that it shares with the concept of existence “should convince us that 
there is at least very good reason to think that existence is univocal.”15  It is not clear, 
however, how it is that these two points combine to defeat Putnam’s suggestion that the 
concept of existence is not univocal. Questions of the ontological status of various objects 
might strike us as incredibly different when compared. Does a piece of music consist in the 
various pages (or PDFs) on which it is recorded, or in its public performances, or in all of its 
performances, or in some other aspect (its essence)? Such considerations contrast sharply 
with what might be involved in establishing the ontological status of a table or some other 
piece of furniture. It might be that to say that a particular Bach cello suite exists and that a 
certain desk exists is simply to deny that the number of either object is zero, but this does not 
appear to speak to the fact that what is involved in making such an assertion seems markedly 
different in each case.  
                                                 
13 Van Inwagen suggests that “perhaps a debate about sums is silly for some reason peculiar to sums, a reason 
that does not apply to other ontological debates.” See van Inwagen, "Being, Existence and Ontological 
Commitment," p. 490. 
14 Ibid., pp. 490-91. 
15 Ibid., p. 482. 
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That is to say that there still seem to be differences in what is involved in asserting and 
establishing the existence of particular kinds of objects, and it is not clear that the univocacy 
of number smooths these differences over in the way that van Inwagen suggests. On van 
Inwagen’s view, the sense of ‘there is’ does not change between the statements ‘there is one 
Bach cello suite in G major’ and ‘there is one desk in this room’, since statements such as 
‘there exist n F’s’ simply boil down to statements of the form ‘the number of F’s is n’. This 
seems puzzling. If I have printed two copies of suite BWV 1007, why do there not exist two 
Bach cello suites in G major? If two performances differ slightly in emphasis, timing, 
interpretation and so on, why do we not count these as two distinct cello suites? Why is it that 
we hold fast to the notion that there is one cello suite even if one is printed with misprints, 
corrupted, performed mistakenly, and so on? We certainly do not encounter similar 
difficulties when we speak about the existence of desks.  
There simply seems to be more to say about differences in ontology between pieces of music 
and tables that the connection between number and existence does not illuminate at all. More 
specifically, we might accept that statements of existence boil down to statements of number 
without accepting that the concept of existence is therefore univocal. If we have a red table 
and paint it black, it would seem that the statement ‘in this room there exists a black table’ is 
now true, where once it was not. Yet if someone takes Bach’s ‘Suite No. 3 in C major’ and 
transcribes it into F major, it does not seem as though the statement ‘there exists a Bach cello 
suite in F major’ is now true – at the very least it is ambiguous. The person is playing a Bach 
cello suite, and the suite is in F major, but it does not obviously follow from this that there 
exists a Bach cello suite in F major (since questions arise of canonical versions, original 
authorship, and so on) in the way that ‘there exists a black table in this room’ immediately 
follows from the fact that there was a red table in this room and that someone has now 
painted it entirely black.  
What we are attempting to highlight is the fact that what is involved in making, 
understanding and establishing existence claims does seem to differ markedly depending on 
the kind of object in question, as does the way that the truth of such claims seems vulnerable 
to particular questions of alteration and interpretation. In this sense it seems perfectly 
sensible, pace van Inwagen, to suggest that despite the univocacy of number and its intimate 
connection with the concept of existence, affirmations of the existence of different kinds of 
objects do not always mean the same thing. In the face of the differences involved in the 
ontological questions surrounding different kinds of objects, van Inwagen’s insistence that all 
existence claims mean the same thing because they boil down to statements about number 
seems a rather hollow response. 
We might also question van Inwagen’s suggestion that “a single, ‘fixed in advance’ meaning 
for ‘there is’ […] seems to be a presupposition of any attempt to extend the meaning of any 
term by convention.”16 In arguing as such, van Inwagen considers the case of extending the 
notion of a person to include corporations, suggesting that it does not make sense to consider 
such an extension unless one has already decided that there is at least one corporation for 
such an extension to capture. In deciding that there is at least one corporation which could 
                                                 
16 Ibid., p. 491. 
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plausibly count as a person, van Inwagen suggests that we have already settled the issue 
before any questions of extending a concept by extension can arise. He makes an analogous 
point regarding mereological sums, suggesting that in order to consider extending the concept 
of existence to mereological sums, one must already think that there is (exists) one 
mereological sum to which such an extension will apply.  
What van Inwagen rejects is the notion that we can phrase the question of extending the 
concept of existence by convention without implying that the objects in question exist. 
Asking ‘should we say that these sums exist?’ is unsuitable in this sense because by referring 
to the sums we have already implicitly committed to their existence (presumably by referring 
to them). But this does not seem the only way that we can phrase the question. We might 
view the mereological picture as consisting in what Putnam would later refer to as an 
‘optional language’ – a proposal to extend our use of language in one or another way and thus 
to extend our concepts in one direction or other.
17
  
Suppose that the proposal of the mereologist amounts to something like: given object A and 
object B, we may say that there exists a third object, A+B, the spatial location of which will 
correspond to the physical union of the spatial location of A and the spatial location of B. It 
does not seem that any part of this requires that we have already made up our mind as to the 
questions of whether these sums exist antecedently or not. This dynamic seems even more 
intuitive in van Inwagen’s example of corporate personhood. When we ask ourselves if we 
ought to extend the concept of personhood to include corporations of a particular kind, van 
Inwagen suggests that we must believe already that there are corporations to which the 
concept of person applies. Yet it would seem that questions of extending the concept of 
personhood to corporations arise precisely because we are unsure how to proceed. Perhaps 
the idea of extending our concept of personhood in this way might be provoked by some kind 
of loose analogy, legal precedent, pragmatic policy outcome, and so on. There is no reason 
that we must assume the proposal to extend our concept of person in this way must come 
from someone who has already preordained that corporations are, in fact, persons.  
VAN INWAGEN ON THEORIES OF PARTS AND WHOLES 
In ‘The Number of Things’, van Inwagen offers a different reason for rejecting Putnam’s 
comments on the matter of conceptual relativity. Discussing the mereological case, van 
Inwagen notes that mereology is simply one amongst many possible theories of parts and 
wholes, and that these theories differ from one another in pronounced and specific ways. For 
instance, the mereological nihilist holds that nothing has any proper parts, while the 
mereological pluralist insists that any set of objects gives rise to at least one mereological 
sum (and perhaps more). Van Inwagen insists that the nihilist or pluralist are not simply 
articulating different versions of mereology, but rather that “Nihilism, Pluralism, and any 
version of mereology are competing theories, full stop.”18 So it is that the dispute between 
                                                 
17 Putnam adopted this terminology as a result of an exchange with Jennifer Case. See Jennifer Case, "The Heart 
of Putnam’s Pluralistic Realism," Revue International de Philosophie 55, no. 218 (2001). 
18 van Inwagen, "The Number of Things," p. 190. 
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Putnam’s Carnap and the Polish Logician is characterised by the truth or falsity of various 
descriptions of the world: 
“If Putnam's Carnap says that a world that contains exactly three simples 
contains exactly three objects or exactly three individuals full stop, then he must 
reject Mereology-he must contend that Mereology is a false theory. And the 
"Polish logician" must hold that the description 'a world that contains three 
simples and nothing else' is an impossible description.”19 
On van Inwagen’s view, therefore, it makes perfect sense to ask which of the two theories is 
right, or whether there could be a world that contained nothing but three simples. If 
mereology is correct, van Inwagen argues, the answer to this question is no.  
As a theory of parts and wholes (and therefore as a description of the world), van Inwagen 
rejects mereology. Considering his dog Sonia and his cat Moriarty, van Inwagen notes that if 
mereology is a true theory, there is an object that corresponds to the sum of Sonia and 
Moriarty. That is to say that “there exists a scattered object that weighs about twenty-five 
pounds and has two maximally connected parts each of which is now asleep, is about forty 
feet from the other, and is covered with fur.”20 Van Inwagen’s response to such a suggestion 
is that there is simply no good reason for thinking that such an object exists, since “nothing 
has the set of properties a thing would have to have to be that sum.”21 That is to say that, as 
theories of parts and wholes, Putnam’s mereologist and traditional logician do not present 
equivalent descriptions of the world because we do not, in some situations, have any reason 
for believing that the kinds of objects the mereologist describes exist, or at least that any 
object possesses the kind of properties that it must in order to be a mereological sum. In 
short: simply because a theory exists which tells us that we must posit strange, discontinuous 
objects does not mean that we must accept this theory. 
To this kind of metaphysical objection, it seems that there is what might seem a similarly 
metaphysical rejoinder: is it not the case that many of the objects that feature most 
prominently in our daily lives (not to mention in our philosophy) are some variety of strange, 
discontinuous objects? Chairs, bodies, solar systems, galaxies, buildings, and so on? There 
are many kinds of objects that we take to be unproblematic that might strike us, upon 
reflection, as unnatural in somewhat the same way as the mereological sum of van Inwagen’s 
two pets might seem unnatural. Is the solar system not something like the mereological sum 
of its constituent planets along with the sun? Does it consist of all of the empty space in 
between? We might say that modern astrophysics presents us with more compelling reasons 
to treat the solar system as somehow more continuous an object than the sum of Sonia and 
Moriarty, but we seem on thin ice here. If we say that the sum of Sonia and Moriarty does not 
exist because we cannot tell a plausible enough physical story about their interaction qua 
object, then we appear very close to suggesting the questions of existence can be answered 
only once we consider the plausibility of the various physical stories we might tell about 
                                                 
19 Ibid., p. 191. 
20 Ibid., p. 192. 
21 Ibid. 
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certain collections of objects. As van Inwagen might otherwise ask: how can we begin to 
consider such explanations when questions of existence have not yet been settled?
22
 
The problem appears to be that van Inwagen wishes to hold both that there is a univocal, 
objective formulation of the concept of existence and that certain applications of this concept 
might be rejected on the basis of (what appear to be) pragmatic value judgements. Van 
Inwagen appeals to some notions of ontological parsimony and conceptual simplicity in 
rejecting the mereological picture of the world, reminding us that “after all, that there is a 
theory that says there is something with certain properties is, taken by itself, a rather 
unimpressive reason for believing that there is something that has those properties.”23 True as 
this undoubtedly is, there seems something out of place here. Van Inwagen’s suggestion is 
that questions of conceivability, simplicity and parsimony allow us to adjudicate between 
correct and incorrect formulations of the concept of existence, and that conflict between 
theories of parts and wholes may be settled objectively on the basis of such considerations. 
We might think of the process in this way as following the pattern of modern scientific 
thought, in the sense that, as Putnam himself notes, “normative judgements are essential to 
the practice of modern science itself.”24  
Yet there is at least something empirical that guides the employment of normative value 
judgements in the scientific case. Even if one believes that scientific facts can be neatly 
disentangled from scientific values, it is not clear that the same kind of disentanglement is 
possible in situations that do not turn on the same kind of body of empirical data. When van 
Inwagen himself looks to defend his rather eccentric view that only parts that form living 
organisms qualify as coherent wholes (objects), he does so on the basis of the implications of 
such a formulation on usage and neighbouring concepts, as well as considerations of what we 
can conceive, imagine and plausibly discuss.
25
 Given his self-stated debt to the classical 
American pragmatists, Putnam certainly does not object to this way of proceeding. Indeed in 
some ways such an approach resembles Dewey’s vision of philosophy as a kind of 
“intellectual disrobing” whereby we may inspect our concepts and habits critically “to see 
what they are made of and what wearing them does to us.”26 What Putnam does object to, 
however, is the notion that this process is capable of furnishing us with any facts about the 
definitive formulations of the concepts in question. 
In short: what is problematic about van Inwagen’s response to Putnam is not its reliance on 
broadly pragmatic, value-based methods of adjudicating such disputes per se, but rather the 
concurrent insistence that such disputes are genuine conflicts of fact and as such that there is 
a definitive and metaphysically-privileged formulation of the concepts of ‘object’ and 
                                                 
22 Van Inwagen himself summarises his argument from Material Beings in similar terms: “if a thing doesn't 
exist, it isn't there for you to establish a convention to the effect that it shall be called an 'object' (or anything 
else); if it does exist, the term 'object' applies to it, since the term applies to everything.” See ibid., p. 196, 
footnote 23. 
23 Ibid., p. 192. 
24 Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2002), p. 30. 
25 Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995). 
26 John Dewey, John Dewey: The Later Works (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981-91), vol 1, 
p. 40. 
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‘existence’ that we might uncover. In offering this second argument, van Inwagen hopes to 
demonstrate that Putnam is wrong to insist that the descriptions of the mereologist and the 
traditional logician are in some sense ‘equally good’, since we are able to reject the 
mereological theory for principled reasons. As such, van Inwagen suggests that we should 
feel no discomfort in holding fast to the notion that there is one definitively correct 
formulation of the concept of object rather than many equally workable ones. Yet he 
encounters two difficulties. The first is that the principled reasons to which van Inwagen 
points seem to open up something of a metaphysical problem, in that they do not provide 
particularly clear criteria for judging what is or is not natural, plausible, sensible enough to be 
considered anything other than a strange and discontinuous object. 
The second difficulty, however, runs far deeper. In the absence of any rigorous explication of 
how strange (discontinuous, implausible, unnatural, etc.) an object must be before we are 
unable to countenance its existence, van Inwagen justifies his rejection of mereology and his 
insistence on the seriousness of the conflict at hand by reference to a variety of pragmatic 
concerns. In the face of this move, his insistence that there is, in fact, a correct formulation of 
the concepts of existence and object seems hollow. Is it not the case that what seems 
implausible, unnatural and so on shifts depending on our theoretical perspectives, focuses and 
needs?  
So it is that the thrust of Putnam’s notion of conceptual relativity carries through into such 
metaphilosophical territory. In such metaphilosophical matters, the spectre of Dewey looms 
large over Putnam’s approach. In Experience and Nature, Dewey writes: 
“It [philosophy] has no call to create a world of “reality” de novo, nor to delve 
into secrets of Being hidden from common sense and science. It has no stock of 
information or body of knowledge peculiarly its own.”27 
Putnam does not doubt the sincerity of the kinds of disagreements that van Inwagen 
describes, and would likely even grant the suggestion that “Putnam's Polish logician and I 
disagree not only about simple, imaginary worlds, but about the real world.”28 Yet in the 
absence of any empirical pronouncement on the matter, Putnam insists along with Dewey 
that philosophy is not in a position to adjudicate these conceptual disputes as matters of fact. 
In situations of conceptual relativity, we find ourselves free to extend (or not) our concepts in 
various directions, and the role of philosophy in this endeavour is to take stock of what is at 
stake in the decision before us. Van Inwagen and the Metaphysical Realist hope for what 
Dewey calls “the recovery of a primitive naïveté”,29 but on the basis of his examination of the 
phenomenon of conceptual relativity, Putnam insists that the best we can hope for is to 
cultivate a sense of what is at stake in each situation and address our practical needs as best 
we can.  
Once pragmatic methods of adjudication make their way onto the scene, we find ourselves 
confronted with the fact that there are inevitably different, equally reasonable ways of 
                                                 
27 John Dewey, Experience and Nature (La Salle: Open Court, 1925), pp. 407-08. 
28 van Inwagen, "The Number of Things," p. 194. 
29 Dewey, John Dewey: The Later Works, vol 1, p. 40. 
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applying such principles. In other words, with respect to these pragmatic principles, a kind of 
de jure pluralism reigns which the Metaphysical Realist finds intolerable. In the face of such 
situations of conceptual relativity we may agree and disagree on the basis of all of the 
pragmatic principles employed by van Inwagen, but to suggest that what is at stake is the 
‘real’ or ‘definitive’ version of the concept of existence or object is, as Putnam says, to find 
ourselves already wandering in Cloud Cookoo Land.
30
  
 
Word count: 16445 
 
  
                                                 
30 In full, Putnam writes that “once we assume that there is, somehow fixed in advance, a single ‘real’ and a 
single ‘literal’ sense of ‘exist’ – and, by the way, a single ‘literal’ sense of ‘identity’ – one which is cast in 
marble and cannot be either contracted or expanded without defiling the statue of the god, we are already 
wandering in Cloud Cuckoo Land.” Putnam, Ethics without Ontology, p. 84. 
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